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I. INTRODUCTION
This year’s Survey marks fifty years since the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) first became a part of Texas statutory law.1 One year after
* Professor of Law and Foundation Professor of Commercial Law, Texas Tech Uni-
versity. B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M. Harvard University.
1. The Code first became effective in Texas on July 1, 1966, as a separate statute. See
Uniform Commercial Code, 1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 721, § 1-101, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws
1951. It was reenacted in 1967 as part of the Business & Commerce Code, the first of the
codes promulgated under the Texas Codification Act. In that process, the designation of
“Article” in the Official Text was changed to “Chapter,” subsections were designated by
letters rather than numbers, and a period instead of a dash was used to designate sections.
Thus, for example, Section 2-204(1) in the Official Text became Section 2.204(a) in the
Texas codification. Revisions of the Code that have taken place since 1967 still substitute
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its initial effective date, the UCC was reenacted as part of the Business &
Commerce Code (Code). Since then, a considerable body of law has de-
veloped to interpret and apply the Code. While many of the recent cases
involve application of established principles, others address new issues or
refine the interpretation of past analyses. Cases decided during this Sur-
vey period fall into all of these categories.
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. APPLICATION OF CHAPTER 2
Chapter 2 of the Code governs the sale of goods.2 While it is often easy
to determine that Chapter 2 applies to a given transaction, that determi-
nation is sometimes more difficult.3 In Malin International Ship Repair &
Drydock, Inc. v. Oceanografia, S.A. de C.V.,4 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit addressed the question of whether Chapter 2 gov-
erned a contract for fuel bunkers installed on a vessel for a vessel opera-
tor who had use of the vessel under a “bareboat charter.”5 The issue
arose when a shipyard installed fuel bunkers on the chartered vessel and
the vessel operator failed to pay for the bunkers and the installation when
the vessel was delivered. The shipyard operator filed an attachment
against the bunkers under Supplemental Admiralty Rule B to obtain ju-
risdiction over the vessel operator.6 The Fifth Circuit held that sale of the
fuel bunkers was not under a contract of sale governed by Chapter 2, but
rather a transaction covered by “the bareboat charter agreement.”7
“Chapter” for “Article,” and still use a period instead of a dash, but now use the Official
Text system for designating subsections. See, e.g., Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch.
921, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 4582 (effective on Jan. 1, 1996). As currently enacted, Chap-
ter 2 is the only chapter of the Code that retains the older non-uniform system to designate
subsections. In the grand scheme of things, this is a minor point, but it can be confusing
when doing Code research and in correlating the text of the Official Comments (which
have not been adopted in Texas as part of the Code itself) to the statutory provisions. It
can also affect searching on WestLaw and LEXIS if the searcher is trying to track case
interpretations of particular sections of the Code because of the variation in section and
subsection designations over the years.
2. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (West 2009) (“Unless the context otherwise
requires, this chapter applies to transactions in goods . . . .”); § 2.105(a) (“‘Goods’ means
all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of iden-
tification to the contract for sale . . . .”).
3. One example of this difficulty is the split among the courts about whether electric-
ity is a good or a service. Some hold that electricity is a good. See, e.g., In re Grede Foun-
dries, Inc., 435 B.R. 593, 595–96 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2010); In re Erving Indus., Inc., 432
B.R. 354, 370 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010). Others hold that it is a service. See, e.g., In re NE
Opco, Inc., 501 B.R. 233, 256 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013); In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 421 B.R.
231, 240 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
4. 817 F.3d 241, 247–48 (5th Cir. 2016).
5. Id. at 243. A “bareboat charter” is one under which a vessel operator rents use of a
vessel from the vessel owner for a period of time and supplies its own crew and provisions
rather than a charter under which the vessel owner supplies the crew and provisions. See
MARK HUBER, TANKER OPERATIONS: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PERSON-IN-CHARGE (PIC)
212–13 (4th ed. 2001).
6. Malin Int’l, 817 F.3d at 243. Supplemental Rule B is a part of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure dealing with admiralty and maritime claims. FED. R. CIV. P. XIII(B).
7. Malin Int’l, 817 F.3d at 248.
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Under these circumstances, Texas common law applied to the transac-
tion.8 Applying that law, the Fifth Circuit held that title to the fuel
bunkers passed to the vessel operator at the time of delivery and this, in
turn, created an interest in the bunkers on the part of the vessel operator
that could be attached by the shipyard under Supplemental Rule B.9
Summary judgment in favor of the shipyard for the price of the fuel
bunkers, cost of installation, and attorney’s fees was affirmed.10
B. CONTRACT FORMATION
Although Chapter 2 contains some provisions modifying common law
rules, it still embraces or states many common law contract principles.
Section 2.204 is an example of how the Code both draws on the common
law of contracts, and how it liberalizes the circumstances in which a con-
tract may be found to exist.11 Under that section a contract
may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including
conduct by both parties . . . even though the moment of its making is
undetermined . . . [and] [e]ven though one or more terms are left
open . . . if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is
a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.12
Under Section 2.204, the standard “offer, acceptance, consideration”
dance can be used to show formation of a contract for the sale of goods;
however, the common law was more stringent about finding contracts
formed by conduct, particularly if there were open terms.13 Obermeyer
Hydro Accessories, Inc. v. CSI Calendering, Inc.,14 a decision by the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado, applying Texas law, illustrates
application of the Chapter 2 provisions to the formation of a contract for
the sale of goods. In Obermeyer, a buyer began purchasing rubberized
fabric from a seller. In the latter part of 2012 and in the early part of 2013,
the parties exchanged emails and met in person to discuss a change in the
seller’s billing practice that had the effect of increasing the price of
“calendered” fabric by some forty percent.15 The buyer ordered, and the
seller supplied, calendered fabric while the parties were still discussing
the seller’s new billing terms. Although there was no single moment when
it could be said that a contract based on the new terms had been formed,
8. Id.
9. Id. at 249.
10. Id. at 251.
11. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.204 (West 2009).
12. Id. § 2.204(a)–(c).
13. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 207–09 (3d ed. 1999); JAMES J.
WHITE ET AL., 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES 65–67
(6th ed. 2012).
14. 158 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (D. Colo. 2016).
15. Id. at 1151–52, 1158. According to the district court, “calendered” fabric is fabric
to which a rubber backing is attached to create a reinforced fabric product. The process of
calendaring increases the weight to approximately double the weight of the fabric alone.
Id. at 1153.
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the buyer accepted and paid for deliveries of product.16 The district court
recognized that Texas law does not treat the mere failure to object to a
change in terms as a sufficient course of conduct to indicate agreement.17
Texas law does, however, allow a contract to be formed if a party orders
and pays for goods with knowledge of the terms on which the goods have
been delivered by the seller.18 The district court held that the buyer was
bound to pay at the new price.19 As an alternative holding, the district
court also ruled that even if the parties’ course of dealing and course of
performance did not form a contract, the new billing terms could be used
as the basis for a contract modification under Section 2.209 that became
effective when the buyer not only failed to object to the new terms, but
continued to order and pay for the goods at the increased rate.20
C. WARRANTIES OF QUALITY
In Becker v. Continental Motors, Inc.,21 the owner of an airplane pur-
chased a new aircraft engine and had the engine installed in his plane.
The contract included an express warranty covering the new engine
against defects in materials or performance “[f]or a period of twenty-four
months or . . . 1000 hours of operation, whichever occur[ed] first.”22 The
contract also included a conspicuous clause disclaiming liability for inci-
dental and consequential damages.23
After operating the airplane with the new engine for some 336 hours,
the owner took the plane in for routine maintenance. Afterward, the
owner discovered the engine was using an excessive amount of oil and the
repair service submitted a warranty claim to the manufacturer on the
16. Id. at 1159.
17. See id. at 1164–65.
18. Id. On these points, the district court cited and discussed the seminal holding in
Preston Farm & Ranch Supply, Inc. v. Bio-Zyme Enter., 625 S.W.2d 295, 298–300 (Tex.
1981) (buyer’s conduct in making and paying for additional purchases was a course of
performance indicating agreement to interest charge added to sales price in case of delayed
payment). The district court also discussed subsequent Texas cases emphasizing that the
rule in Preston Farm required more than the buyer’s acknowledgement of a new term, also
requiring action by the buyer indicating agreement to the term. See Tubelite v. Risica &
Sons, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. 1991) (“acquiescence” to service charge may be
shown by ordering, accepting, and paying for “goods with knowledge that a service charge
is being imposed”); Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644
S.W.2d 443, 445–46 (Tex. 1982) (“mere failure to object” does not show agreement to the
“unilateral act of charging interest”).
19. Obermeyer Hydro Accessories, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d at 1171.
20. Id. at 1167–68. On this issue, the district court rejected an argument by the buyer
that the price modification was not in good faith. Id. at 1169. The district court reasoned
that the seller notified the buyer of the price increase well before the increase was imposed
on new orders. Id. The district court also rejected “last ditch” arguments of negligent as-
sent and quasi-estoppel by the seller because the extensive communications between the
parties gave the buyer “reason to know” of the price increase. Id. at 1169–70. Even if the
buyer “should have known,” the seller produced no case law holding “constructive knowl-
edge sufficient to apply the doctrine” of quasi-estoppel. Id. at 1170–71.
21. No. 4:13-CV-520-BJ, 2015 WL 6742104 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2015), appeal filed, No.
16-10166 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2016).
22. Id. at *2.
23. Id.
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owner’s behalf. During the next five months, attempts to repair failed,
and the owner ultimately sued for breach of the express warranty, seek-
ing direct damages for the cost of replacing and installing a new engine,
along with the cost of hangar rental while repairs and replacement took
place. The owner also sought loss of use damages for the aircraft “down-
time.”24
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas held the
manufacturer was liable for breach of express warranty and allowed re-
covery of the direct damages incurred for attempted repair and eventual
replacement of the engine, along with the hangar rental.25 With respect to
the loss of use damages, however, the district court ruled the disclaimer
effectively barred recovery of incidental or consequential damages under
Section 2.719 of the Code and denied recovery for loss of use.26 As part
of his claim, the owner also sought recovery under the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (TDTPA), which allows breach of warranty claims to
be brought under that Act as well as under Chapter 2 of the Code.27 On
this issue, the district court ruled that the TDTPA claim was “substan-
tively the same as” the Chapter 2 claim.28 Furthermore, there was no
proof that the manufacturer had acted knowingly or intentionally.29 Ab-
sent such proof, recovery under the TDTPA was the same as that allowed
under Chapter 2.30 The owner was, however, allowed to recover attor-
ney’s fees as provided in Section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice & Civil
Remedies Code and by Section 17.50(d) of the TDTPA.31
An issue that can arise in warranty litigation when the defendant is a
non-manufacturing seller is whether the claim is actually a products liabil-
ity claim barred by Section 82.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Reme-
24. Id. at *1–5.
25. Id. at *8–9.
26. Id. at *9–10. The district court noted that under TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.719(c) (West 2009), a limitation or exclusion of consequential damages will not be ef-
fective if the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Id. at *9 & n.13. The district court
ruled that the limitation in the case at bar was not unconscionable. Id. at *10. This ruling in
Becker should be compared with the determination in E.F. Johnson Co. v. Infinity Global
Tech., No. 05-14-01209-CV, 2016 WL 4254496 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op), where the court held that a limitation of liability clause in a distributorship
contract was unreasonable and unenforceable because, under the circumstances of the
case, it failed to provide “minimum adequate remedies” to the aggrieved seller by allowing
a buyer to renege on its “‘irrevocable and non-cancellable’ minimum purchase commit-
ment.” Id. at *4–5.
27. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1)–(4) (West 2011).
28. Becker, 2015 WL 6742104, at *11.
29. Id. at *12.
30. Id. at *11–12.
31. Id. at *12–13. In Medical City Dallas, Ltd. v. Carlisle Corp., 251 S.W.3d 55, 63 (Tex.
2008), the Texas Supreme Court held that breach of express warranty claims are founded
in contract for the purpose of recovery of attorney’s fees under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 1997). As to TDTPA claims, see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.50(d) (West 2011) (“Each consumer who prevails shall be awarded court costs and
reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.”).
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dies Code.32 In Lopez v. Huron,33 a buyer purchased a large number of
plastic bags from a non-manufacturing seller who ordered the bags from
the manufacturer for shipment directly to the buyer. The buyer used the
bags to package masa, a type of dried corn meal. The buyer sold 1,695
cases of the packaged masa to one of its own customers.34 The customer
returned all of the packaged masa because a defect in the plastic bags
caused the bags to leak and spoil the masa. After replacing the shipment
with another shipment of masa packaged in bags from another company,
the buyer of the bags sued the non-manufacturing seller and the manufac-
turer of the plastic bags for breach of implied warranty. The jury found in
favor of the buyer against both defendants.35 The non-manufacturing
seller appealed on the ground that the buyer was asserting a products
liability claim because recovery was sought for damage to “other prop-
erty,” the damage to the masa, and not for the economic loss of the
plastic bags themselves.36 The San Antonio Court of Appeals disagreed,
reasoning that the bags were a “component” of the final product, and that
damage to the masa was a foreseeable consequential loss.37 Because this
was an economic loss, and not damage to other property resulting from a
defect in the product itself, recovery on the breach of warranty claim was
upheld.38
Another issue that can affect the ability of a plaintiff to recover on an
implied warranty claim is the pre-suit notice requirement in Section
2.607(c)(1) of the Code.39 In Del Castillo v. PMI Holdings North America
Inc.,40 an explosion at a natural gas plant in Mexico injured or killed a
32. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.003 (West 2011) limits the liability of a
non-manufacturing seller if the plaintiff is attempting to recover for damages going beyond
damages to the product itself. See Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry Cty. Spraying
Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308, 312–13 (Tex. 1978); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil
Products, 572 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. 1978). For example, if a defective toaster catches on
fire, damage to the toaster itself would be a warranty claim not barred by Section 82.003.
But if the fire burns down the purchaser’s house, the claim for damage to the house would
be damage to “other property” and would constitute a products liability claim limiting
recovery against the non-manufacturing seller unless the claimant satisfied one of the ex-
ceptions stated in Section 82.003. The distinction between damage to the product itself and
damage to other property traces its roots in Texas to the seminal decisions in Mid Conti-
nent and Signal Oil, where the court announced what is generally known as the “economic
loss rule.” Under that rule, damage to the product itself is an economic loss recoverable on
a claim for breach of warranty, but not recoverable on a claim of negligence or strict liabil-
ity in tort. See Mid Continent, 572 S.W.2d at 312–13; Signal Oil, 572 S.W.2d at 325. Damage
to the property itself is regarded as a contract claim; damage to other property is regarded
as being founded in tort.
33. 490 S.W.3d 517 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.).
34. Id. at 519.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 520, 522.
37. Id. at 524–25.
38. Id. at 525–26.
39. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607(c)(1) (West 2009) (“Where a tender has
been accepted (1) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy
. . . .”).
40. No. 4:14-CV-03435, 2016 WL 3745953 (S.D. Tex. July 13, 2016).
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number of employees.41 The injured parties and the family members of
the deceased employees filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas on a number of theories, including breach of implied
warranty for products the defendants sold to the gas plant, but without
giving pre-suit notice under Section 2.607(c)(1). Citing Vintage Homes,
Inc. v. Coldiron,42 the plaintiffs argued this section applied only to buyers
and not to bystanders injured by a defective product.43 The district court
disagreed on two grounds.44 First, that the version of Section 2.607 dis-
cussed in Vintage Homes differed from that appearing in the Business &
Commerce Code because it required notice to be given by the buyer to
his seller.45 The version enacted in Texas requires a buyer to give notice
to the seller.46 Second, since the time Vintage Homes was decided, Texas
law had evolved to permit third parties to assert warranty claims against
remote sellers.47 Under these circumstances, case law had clearly estab-
lished that third parties benefitting from the ability to assert claims
against remote sellers should also have the responsibility of giving notice
to such sellers.48 Because of the failure to give notice, the district court
held the plaintiffs were barred from recovery on a breach of implied war-
ranty theory.49
D. GOOD FAITH PURCHASE
Under Section 2.403, a purchaser of goods can acquire good title even
if the seller has a defective title.50 This rule is applicable, however, only if
the seller had a voidable, and not a void, title to the goods.51 This distinc-
tion was sharply drawn in Villarreal v. Jimenez,52 where an automobile
41. Id. at *1.
42. 585 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1979, no writ).
43. Del Castillo, 2016 WL 3745953, at *3.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing McKay v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 751 F.3d 694, 707 (5th Cir. 2014)).
46. Id. (citing McKay, 751 F.3d at 707).
47. See id. at *3.
48. Id.; see, e.g., McKay, 751 F.3d at 706–07; U.S. Tire-Tech, Inc. v. Boeran, B.V., 110
S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). It is worth noting that
the post-Vintage Home cases are all decisions by the federal courts or by the lower Texas
appellate courts predicting Texas law because the Texas Supreme Court, in Wilcox v. Hill-
crest Mem’l Park of Dallas, 701 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam), recognized a
conflict between the holding in Wilcox and the holding in Vintage Homes, but reserved
judgment on the question of whether notice had to be given to anyone other than a buyer’s
immediate seller. The Texas Supreme Court has not expressly addressed this question
again. See the discussion of this matter in U.S. Tire-Tech, 110 S.W.3d at 198–99. The obvi-
ous lesson to be learned from these cases is simple: In a breach of warranty case, give
notice promptly and to anyone who may be a possible defendant.
49. Del Castillo, 2016 WL 3745953, at *3. The district court also dismissed other claims
against all but one of the defendants. See id. at *18. As to that defendant, a pipeline opera-
tor, the court held that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged claims for negligence and gross
negligence on the theory that the defendant breached a duty of care in the inspection and
maintenance of a pipeline. Id. at *6–7.
50. TEX. BUS. & REM. CODE ANN. § 2.403(a) (West 2009).
51. See id.
52. No. 04-15-00544-CV, 2016 WL 3625667 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 6, 2016, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
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paint shop filed and foreclosed on a mechanic’s lien for a vehicle the shop
had painted and for which it had not been paid.53 The owner of the shop
obtained a certificate of title in his own name and sold the vehicle to a
third-party purchaser who acquired a certificate of title in his own name.
The original owner of the vehicle sued the purchaser to recover the vehi-
cle. The purchaser argued he was a good faith purchaser who acquired
good title to the vehicle under Section 2.403 of the Code.54 The trial court
held that the case was governed by the Texas Certificate of Title Act
rather than the Code,55 and under that Act, the paint shop owner had
failed to comply with the statutory requirements for foreclosing on a
mechanic’s lien.56 Because of this failure, the certificates of title issued to
the owner and to the third-party purchaser were void.57 Judgment was
rendered in favor of the original owner.58
On appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals agreed with the trial
court that the paint shop owner failed to comply with the requirements of
the Certificate of Title Act and never acquired a title that would allow
him to sell the vehicle to someone else.59 As to whether the dispute was
governed by the Code instead of the Certificate of Title Act, the court of
appeals correctly held there was no conflict between Section 2.403 and
the Act because the Code clearly states that only a person with voidable
title can transfer good title to a good faith purchaser.60 Because the
owner of the body shop had only a void title, and not a voidable title, the
third-party purchaser also acquired a void title that was not effective
against the ownership interest of the original owner.61 Judgment in favor
53. Id. at *2.
54. Id. at *3.
55. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 501.001–.179 (West 2013). Section 501.005 of that
Act provides that in case of conflict, “Chapters 1–9, Business & Commerce Code, control
over a conflicting provision of this chapter.” Id. § 501.005. The courts of appeals disagree
about the circumstances in which the Code and the Act are in conflict. Compare Park
Cities Ltd. P’ship v. Transpo Funding Corp., 131 S.W.3d 654, 658–59 (Texas App.—Dallas
2004, pet. denied) (Certificate of Title Act controls and sale of motor vehicle void if certifi-
cate of title not transferred at time of sale); Gallas v. Car Biz, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 592, 594
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, writ denied) (Certificate of Title Act controls and sale of motor
vehicle void if certificate of title not transferred at time of sale); Pfluger v. Colquitt, 620
S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (same), with Vibbert v. PAR,
Inc., 224 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.) (Code controls and sale is not
void even though certificate of title not transferred at time of sale); First Nat’l Bank of El
Campo, Tex. v. Buss, 143 S.W.3d 915, 923–24 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied)
(Code controls and sale is not void even though certificate of title not transferred at time of
sale); Hudson Buick, Pontiac, GMC Truck Co. v. Gooch, 7 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.—Tyler
1999, pet. denied) (same). The conflict arises because of differing interpretations of the
statutory language in TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.071(a) (West 2013) and TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (West 2009). A comprehensive analysis of the subject appears in
Jonathon C. Clark, Dude, Where’s My Car? How the Proposed Uniform Certificate of Title
Act Addresses Conflicts Between the Texas Certificate of Title Act and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 45 TEX. J. BUS. L. 209 (2013).
56. Villarreal, 2016 WL 3625667, at *3.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *4.
60. Id.; see TEX. BUS. & REM. CODE ANN. § 2.403(a) (West 2009).
61. Villarreal, 2016 WL 3625667, at *4.
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of the original owner was affirmed.62
E. REMEDIES
In High Rev Power, L.L.C. v. Freeport Logistics, Inc.,63 the Dallas
Court of Appeals addressed an interesting situation involving claims by
an aggrieved American buyer and counterclaims by an aggrieved Chinese
seller.64 Under their contract, the seller agreed to sell 770 go-karts to the
buyer in a series of shipments at an agreed price for each go-kart. The
buyer agreed to pay a twenty percent deposit on the entire order and pay
the balance on each shipment when they cleared customs. Despite a
problem in regard to the eighth and ninth shipments, a tenth shipment
was made and accepted, but the buyer refused to pay for this shipment
because of the problem with the two earlier shipments, and because the
buyer had received information indicating that the seller planned to sell
all remaining shipments to another buyer. Because payment had not been
made for the tenth shipment, the seller refused to make any more ship-
ments to the buyer. The buyer sued for breach of contract, seeking to
recover a portion of the twenty percent down payment and lost profit
damages for the undelivered balance of the original order.65 The seller
filed a counterclaim for the unpaid amount due on the tenth shipment,
the remaining contract balance, and for the amount due and unpaid for
parts ordered by the buyer. At trial, the buyer received a net recovery of
$40,974.66 The seller appealed on the ground that it was entitled to keep
the twenty percent deposit and recover the remaining eighty percent of
the unpaid purchase price.67 The court of appeals disagreed, holding that
under Section 2.708 of the Code, the seller was limited to recovering the
difference between the unpaid contract price and the market price to-
gether with incidental damages caused by the buyer’s breach.68 Because
the seller failed to introduce any evidence showing a difference between
the market price and the contract price, and also failed to show any basis
for a different calculation of damages, the measure of damage provided
by Section 2.708 was upheld.69 Retention of the deposit and recovery of
the unpaid purchase price would, in the words of the court of appeals,
“result in a windfall to [the seller].”70 As to incidental damages, the court
of appeals upheld an award of damages for freight and storage costs in-
62. Id. at *5.
63. No. 05-13-01360, 2016 WL 6462392 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 31, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
64. Id. at *1.
65. Id. at *2.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *4.
68. Id.; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.708(a) (West 2015) (providing, in rele-
vant part, “[T]he measure of damages for non-acceptance or repudiation by the buyer is
the difference between the market price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid
contract price together with any incidental damages provided in this chapter (Section
2.710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer’s breach.”).
69. High Rev Power, L.L.C., 2016 WL 6462392, at *4.
70. Id.
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curred by the seller as allowed by Section 2.710 of the Code.71 The seller’s
claim for payment of some $16,000 for parts failed because there was no
written contract covering the sale of the parts.72 Under Section 2.201 of
the Code, a sale of goods for a price of $500.00 or more must be in writing
to be enforceable.73 By admission of the seller, no written contract ex-
isted for this part of the transaction so recovery on this claim was
barred.74
F. LIMITATIONS
Section 2.725(a) of the Code requires that actions for breach of a sales
contract must be brought within four years of the time when the cause of
action accrued.75 Section 2.725(b) expands on this requirement by provid-
ing that “[a] cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of
the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach.”76 In cases of non-
delivery, non-payment, repudiation, and the like, the time of breach
should generally be fairly easy to determine. In breach of warranty cases,
however, some time may pass before a breach is discovered. To address
this situation, Section 2.725(b) also provides:
A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except
that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the
goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such per-
formance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should
have been discovered.77
Except for warranties that explicitly extend the time for performance,
these provisions leave little room for application of the “discovery
rule.”78
In B. Mahler Interests, L.P. v. DMAC Construction, Inc.,79 an aggrieved
buyer sued a construction company for breach of contract, breach of war-
71. Id.; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.710 (West 2009) (“Incidental damages
to an aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commis-
sions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after
the buyer’s breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting
from the breach.”).
72. High Rev Power, L.L.C., 2016 WL 6462392, at *4.
73. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (West 2009)
74. Id. (containing exceptions to the requirement of a written contract, but none of
these were raised as a ground for satisfying the Chapter 2 Statute of Frauds); High Rev
Power, L.L.C., 2016 WL 6462392, at *4.
75. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (West 2009).
76. Id. § 2.725(b).
77. Id.
78. The “discovery rule” typically means that a cause of action accrues when the in-
jured party knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of a
breach. See, e.g., Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32, 39 (Tex. 2015); BP Am. Prod. Co. v.
Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 66–67 (Tex. 2011). In the case of warranties that explicitly extend
to future performance, the discovery rule does apply. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Certainteed Corp., 710 S.W.2d 544, 546, 548 (Tex. 1986) (express warranty extending to
future performance of roofing material would be breached when defect discovered, but
fact issue existed as to whether language of contract met the requirement that a warranty
must “explicitly extend” to future performance).
79. 503 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
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ranty, fraudulent concealment, and equitable estoppel for alleged defects
in materials used in the construction of an event center.80 Although the
work was completed in January 2008, the buyer did not file suit until Oc-
tober 2012. The buyer argued the defects were not discovered until an
inspection report was made in May 2012, and the cause of action accrued
at that time.81 The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals rejected this
argument on the warranty and breach of contract claims because Section
2.725 clearly states that a breach of warranty accrues upon tender of de-
livery,82 and because the record showed the buyer knew or should have
known of possible defects as early as January 2008.83 Based on the evi-
dence in the record, the court also denied recovery on the fraudulent con-
cealment and equitable estoppel claims because the information available
to the buyer in January 2008 made it unreasonable to rely on any repre-
sentations by the seller about the materials used in the construction.84
Summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the seller.85
III. LEASES OF GOODS
A. LEASE-PURCHASE OR FINANCE LEASE
Chapter 2A of the Code governs leases of goods.86 In Jack County Ap-
praisal District v. Jack County Hospital District,87 the issue before the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals was whether a computerized tomography
(CT) scanner in the possession of a hospital district was exempt from
taxation by the county in which the hospital was located.88 The majority,
affirming summary judgment in favor of the hospital, held the scanner
had been acquired under a lease-purchase contract and was owned by the
hospital on the appraisal date, thereby making it exempt from taxation
under the Texas Tax Code.89 The most interesting part of this case is the
dissenting opinion, which focused on the choice of law provision in the
agreement between the hospital and the leasing company.90 The agree-
ment provided that it was subject to California law, and designated the
transaction as a “Finance Lease.”91 The dissent reasoned that the defini-
tion of finance lease under California law, which is the same as the Texas
definition in Section 2A.103 of the Code, meant the transaction did not
80. Id. at 47.
81. Id. at 49.
82. Id. at 50.
83. See id. at 50–53.
84. Id. at 56–58.
85. Id. at 58.
86. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.102 (West 2009).
87. 484 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.).
88. Id. at 230.
89. Id. at 235. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.11(a) (West 2015) exempts property “owned
by [the] state or by a political subdivision of [the] state” if it is “used for public purposes.”
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.11(h) (2015) provides, in part, that “property is owned . . . if it
is subject to a lease-purchase agreement” allowing the state or a political subdivision to
“compel delivery of the legal title . . . at the end of the lease term.”
90. See Jack Cty. Appraisal Dist., 484 S.W.3d at 235–39 (Gabriel, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 236.
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meet the exemption provision in the Texas Tax Code.92 The dissent con-
cluded that summary judgment in favor of the hospital district should
have been reversed and, instead, remanded to the trial court for further
review to determine if the hospital district was entitled to summary judg-
ment on a different ground.93 Whether the majority was right or wrong
about the ultimate decision exempting the hospital district from taxation
is immaterial. It is disturbing to see a court ignore a choice of law clause
agreed to by the parties in a written contract without at least explaining
why the clause was not relevant to the decision.
IV. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
Chapter 3 of the Code “applies to negotiable instruments.”94 Whether
or not an instrument qualifies as a negotiable instrument depends on
compliance with the formal requirements of Section 3.104(a) which
states, in general, that an instrument must contain an “unconditional
promise” to pay a fixed amount of money, “with or without interest or”
the like, be “payable to” order or bearer, be “payable on demand or at a
definite time,” and include no other undertakings except for those listed
in subsection (a).95 A promise to “give, maintain, or protect collateral” is
one of the allowed undertakings.96 Although it seems clear that Section
3.104(a) allows an instrument to include references to collateral without
destroying negotiability, the waters were muddied by the opinion in
Bables v. Citimortgage, Inc.97 In Bables, the plaintiffs sought to avoid
foreclosure of their home.98 In its opinion, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas seemed to accept the defendant’s argument that
a note secured by real property is not a negotiable instrument under
Chapter 3.99 Unfortunately, the district court did not quote the language
92. Id. at 236–37. Compare TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.103(a)(7) (West
2009), with CAL. COM. CODE § 10103(a)(7) (West 2002 & Supp. 2017).
93. Jack Cty. Appraisal Dist., 484 S.W.3d at 238.
94. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 3.102(a) (West 2002) (“This chapter applies to negotia-
ble instruments. It does not apply to money, to payment orders governed by Chapter 4A,
or to securities governed by Chapter 8.”).
95. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 3.104(a)(3)(A) (West 2002 & Supp. 2016).
96. Id.
97. No. 4:16cv104, 2016 WL 1450201 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2016).
98. Id. at *1.
99. The district court provides multiple sources to support its reasoning:
As to Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant’s foreclosure efforts violate Chapter 3
of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, Defendant’s authorities demon-
strate that a note on real property does not fall within the UCC. [TEX. BUS.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 cmt. 2 (West 2002 & Supp. 2016)] (“Article 3 is
not meant to apply to contracts for the sale of goods or services or the sale or
lease of real property or similar writings that may contain a promise to pay
money”); see also [TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(d)(11) (West
2016)] (“This chapter does not apply to: the creation or transfer of an interest
in or lien on real property. . . .”); [Clapp v. Wells Fargo, Nat. Ass’n, No. 4:14-
CV-035-A, 2014 WL 1677805, at *3] (N.D. Tex. 2014) (“[C]ontrary to plain-
tiffs’ assertions, a mortgage note is not ‘within’ the UCC because the Deed of
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of the note itself, and this makes it impossible to tell if the note merely
referred to the deed of trust (which would not affect negotiability) or if it
made the note subject to the deed of trust (which would destroy negotia-
bility).100 To the extent the language of the district court can be read to
mean that a note secured by an interest in real property is automatically
non-negotiable, the district court was in error and it is to be hoped this
reading does not become a standard interpretation of mortgage notes in
Texas.
Despite its lack of clarity, the result in Bables was correct. The assignee
of the note was allowed to foreclose on the deed of trust,101 a result con-
sistent with a long line of Texas cases rejecting the “show-me-the-note” or
the “wet-ink” theory as a condition to the foreclosure of a deed of
trust.102
B. ENFORCEMENT OF INSTRUMENTS
Martin v. Federal National Mortgage Association103 was another mort-
gage foreclosure case—this time concerning a provision in the deed of
trust securing the note. The issue before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit was whether a non-waiver provision in the deed of trust
securing the note prevented the holder of the note and deed of trust from
foreclosing by accepting payments after the maker had defaulted on the
note.104 The Fifth Circuit held that the non-waiver provision was effective
and the holder was entitled to foreclose.105
In LSREF2 Cobalt (TX), LLC v. 410 Centre LLC,106 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals held that a non-waiver clause contained in a note and
accompanying guaranty was effective to prevent the guarantors from as-
serting that the plaintiff waived the right to collect a deficiency after fore-
closure without allowing the guarantors to assert their right of offset
Trust places a lien on real property, it is not governed by the UCC.”) [(quot-
ing Vogel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 966 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1998, no pet.))]. Plaintiff has not shown how, despite this clear au-
thority, Defendant’s attempt at foreclosure violates the Texas Business and
Commerce Code.
Id. at *2.
100. Bables, 2016 WL 1450201, at *2.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 722 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir.
2013); Claudio D. v. Countrywide KB Home Loans, No. 3:14-CV-3969-K, 2016 WL
1003839, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2016) (“This theory has been widely rejected by courts
in Texas.”), aff’d, 2016 WL 950322 (Mar. 3, 2016) (accepting findings and recommendation
of magistrate judge); Johnson-Williams v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-3927-M (BH),
2015 WL 4997811, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2015) (accepting findings and recommendation
of magistrate judge), aff’d on other grounds sub. nom., Johnson-Williams v. Mortgage Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., No. 16-10276, 2017 WL 56053 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2017); Reardean v.
CitiMortgage, Inc., No. A-11-CA-420-SS, 2011 WL 3268307, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 25,
2011); Bierwirth v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. 03-11-00644-CV, 2012 WL
3793190, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 30, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
103. 814 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2016).
104. Id. at 316–17.
105. Id. at 319.
106. 501 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied).
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under the Texas Property Code.107 The court of appeals pointed out that
because the guaranty was not a negotiable instrument, and the record
showed that the plaintiff had acquired the guaranty by proper assign-
ment, the plaintiff was not required to prove it was also the holder of the
note to enforce the guaranty.108
In contrast to LSREF2, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals in
EverBank, N.A. v. Seedergy Ventures, Inc.,109 addressed the issue of
whether the transferee of a note qualified as a holder entitled to foreclose
on a deed of trust securing the note. In Everbank, a purchaser of property
at a constable’s auction brought an action to quiet title to the property.
The purchaser alleged that defects in the assignment of the deed of trust
and in the transfer of the note barred a foreclosure sale of the property
by the defendant.110 On the issue of assignment, the court of appeals held
that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of proving a break in the deed
of trust chain of assignments.111 As to transfer of the note, the court of
appeals referred to Section 3.205(b) of the Code, and held that possession
of a note indorsed in blank was effective to make the defendant, as the
bearer of the note, a holder entitled to foreclose even if there were de-
fects in the deed of trust assignment.112 Summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff was reversed, and judgment rendered in favor of the
defendant.113
Under Section 3.301 of the Code, a person may be “a person entitled to
enforce” an instrument even if the person does not qualify as a holder.114
In Cooper v. Campbell,115 in addition to other defenses, the maker of a
note contested the right of the person in possession to enforce the note
against him.116 After reviewing the provisions in Section 3.301, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the terms of the note specifically provided
that it could be transferred by assignment.117 Evidence in the record
showed that the plaintiff was the owner of the note and had the right to
107. Id. at 629–30, 637. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(c) (West 2014) allows a party
obligated on a debt secured by real estate to offset a deficiency if the “fair market value” of
the real estate is “greater than the [foreclosure] sale price.” The amount of the offset is
determined by the difference between the “fair market value” and “the sale price.” Id.
108. LSREF2 Cobalt (TX), LLC, 501 S.W.3d at 636.
109. 499 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
110. Id. at 536–37.
111. Id. at 540.
112. Id. at 541; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.205(b) (West 2002) (“When in-
dorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by trans-
fer of possession alone until specially endorsed.”).
113. EverBank, 499 S.W.3d at 544.
114. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.301 (West 2002) (“‘Person entitled to enforce’
an instrument means . . . (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights
of a holder . . . .” This situation can occur because TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.203(b) (West 2002) states, “Transfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a
negotiation, vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument,
including any right as a holder in due course.”).
115. No. 05-15-00340-CV, 2016 WL 4487924 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 24, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
116. Id. at *1.
117. Id. at *5–6.
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enforce it even if the plaintiff did not qualify as a holder.118 The court of
appeals rejected the maker’s defense that only a holder could enforce a
note.119 The court of appeals also rejected the maker’s defense that the
note was a non-recourse note limiting his liability to the value of the col-
lateral because the maker did not satisfy a condition in the note that he
use his partnership distributions to repay the note.120 The judgment of the
trial court in favor of the owner of the note was affirmed.121
C. RIGHTS OF ACCOMMODATION PARTIES
In Giles v. Carter,122 two friends (Friend One and Friend Two) decided
to buy a house. Each of them would pay one-half of the monthly pay-
ments. To this end, Friend One co-signed a bank loan for the purchase as
an accommodation party. In separate transactions, Friend One also made
two personal loans of $20,000 each to Friend Two. For about one year,
they split the cost of the mortgage payments; for the next five years, how-
ever, Friend One made all of the payments, totaling slightly more than
$104,000. The friends thereafter had a falling out. The house was sold and
Friend One, as the co-signing accommodation party, paid the note holder
$16,200 to settle the deficiency remaining after the sale. At that point,
Friend One sued Friend Two for $30,000 that remained unpaid on the
personal loans, for $16,200 paid as an accommodation party, for one-half
of the mortgage payments that Friend One had been making, and for
attorney’s fees.123 The trial court granted judgment in favor of Friend
One for the unpaid balance on the personal loan, and for the amount the
lender paid on the co-signed loan as an accommodation party, but denied
recovery for one-half of the mortgage payments and attorney’s fees. Both
parties appealed.124
The Waco Court of Appeals held that the trial court was correct in
awarding damages for the unpaid personal loan, and for the amount paid
by Friend One as an accommodation party.125 The court of appeals dis-
agreed, however, with the other rulings by the trial court.126 On the
breach of contract claim to recover one-half of the mortgage payments,
the court ruled that the evidence supported the claim and reversed the
trial court on this issue.127 As to recovery of attorney’s fees, the court
separately addressed the rights of Friend One on the loan agreement and
118. Id. at *6–7.
119. Id. at *7.
120. Id. at *9.
121. Id. In addition to affirming the judgment of the trial court as to the maker’s liabil-
ity, the court also reversed the rulings by the trial court regarding a cross appeal by the
owner of the note on issues of equitable forfeiture and a demand for an accounting, both of
which had been denied by the court below. Id. at *14.
122. No. 10-15-00286-CV, 2016 WL 7177566 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 7, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
123. Id. at *1–2.
124. Id. at *1.
125. Id. at *2.
126. Id. at *6.
127. Id. at *3.
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on the right to recover for payment of the co-signed loan as an accommo-
dation party.128 The court reasoned that an agreement to repay a loan is a
contract.129 Because the lender was entitled to recover for breach of con-
tract, the lender could also recover attorney’s fees for this breach under
Section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code.130 The most
interesting part of the case was whether attorney’s fees could be recov-
ered by an accommodation party who pays all or part of the amount due
on a note. On this issue, the court of appeals reasoned that under Section
3.419 of the Code, an “accommodation party . . . is entitled to reimburse-
ment from the original obligor on the note” for payments made on a
note.131 Because a note is a contract, the rights of an accommodation
party arise out of the note and are, therefore, rights based on a con-
tract.132 The case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Friend
One for one-half of the mortgage payments and for recovery of attorney’s
fees.133
V. BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
A. RIGHT OF CHARGE-BACK BY COLLECTING BANKS
A common check fraud involves a wrongdoer inducing the victim to
deposit a check sent by the wrongdoer to the victim and wire-transferring
part of the amount of the check to an account designated by the wrong-
doer.134 All too often, the check turns out to be counterfeit and the wired
funds have vanished.135 Unfortunately, the victim is unaware that the
transferred funds were part of a provisional credit entered in the victim’s
account at the time of deposit while the check was in the process of col-
lection, and were not “real money” received by actual final payment of
128. Id. at *4–5.
129. Id. at *4.
130. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 2008)).
131. Id. at *5 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419(f) (West 2002 & Supp.
2016) (“An accommodation party who pays the instrument is entitled to reimbursement
from the accommodated party and is entitled to enforce the instrument against the accom-
modated party.”)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at *6.
134. The seeming legitimacy of the scheme is often enhanced when the check sent to
the victim appears to be a cashier’s check or teller’s check issued by a bank. The victim is
lulled into believing, “It’s a bank check—what could go wrong?” Schemes of this kind are
described at FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER INFO., Fake Checks, (Dec. 2012), https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0159-fake-checks [https://perma.cc/U6BV-M5VS] and CON-
SUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, Ask CFBB—Bank Accounts and Services, http://www
.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/search/?selected_facets=category_exact:bank-accounts-and-
services&selected_facets=category_exact:fraud-or-scam [https://perma.cc/6Z6E-97BR]
(last visited Mar. 7, 2017) (Selected: Fraud or scam).
135. Advanced computers and high-quality color printing have allowed wrongdoers to
produce remarkably realistic counterfeit checks. Fake Checks, supra note 134. For exam-
ple, go to https://www.google.com and search in search bar for “counterfeit check images,”
then follow “Images” hyperlink.
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the check.136 In American Dream Team, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank,137 a
real estate company fell victim to this kind of fraud when it received an
email from a person claiming to be an executive with a Chinese company.
The sender expressed an interest in purchasing a home in the United
States for his retirement.138 Following an exchange of emails and pictures
of various homes, the prospective purchaser advised the real estate com-
pany that it would be receiving a $35,000 check from the purchaser’s
stockbroker. Five thousand dollars was to be used as a down payment on
a house selected by the purchaser, and the remaining thirty thousand dol-
lars was to be wired to a bank account in Japan. When the check arrived,
there was a discrepancy between the numerical amount and the written
amount, and the bank entered a provisional credit in the lower written
amount when the check was deposited.139 At that time, the company was
told that collection could take between one and two months because the
check was drawn on a Canadian bank. About two weeks later, the presi-
dent of the real estate company asked a bank employee about the funds
and was told that the funds appeared to be there. The company pro-
ceeded to wire thirty thousand dollars to the Japanese bank. In mid-
March, the bank and the real estate company learned the check was
counterfeit and the bank charged thirty thousand dollars back against the
company escrow account.140 The company sued the bank on a variety of
theories, including breach of contract and common law fraud. The bank
counterclaimed for breach of warranty in the transfer of the instrument
under Sections 3.416 and 4.207 of the Code, and on the ground that the
plaintiff’s claims were preempted by the Code.141 The trial court ruled in
favor of the bank and the real estate company appealed.142
The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.143
On the breach of contract claim, the court of appeals held that Section
4.214 of the Code gave the collecting bank a right of charge back against
any provisional credit and preempted a claim for breach of contract.144
The court ruled, however, that Section 4.214 did not preempt the com-
mon law fraud claim because Section 1.103 of the Code identifies “fraud
136. Chapter 4 of the Code distinguishes between provisional settlement, final settle-
ment, and final payment. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.213(c), 4.214(a),
4.215(e) (West 2002).
137. 481 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, pet. denied).
138. Id. at 728–29.
139. Id. at 729–30. The numerical amount of the check stated “$35,000.00USD.” The
written amount “stated ‘Thirty Thousand and 00/100 U.S. Dollars.” Id. at 729. Under TEX.
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.114 (West 2002), in case of conflict, “words prevail over
numbers.” The difference can be significant. See Charles R. Tips Family Trust v. PB Com-
mercial LLC, 459 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (holding
that where note stated it was in the amount of “One Million Seven Thousand and NO/100
($1,700,000.00) Dollars,” the words controlled, and recovery on the note was limited to the
lower amount, a difference of $693,000.)
140. Am. Dream Team, Inc., 481 S.W.3d at 729–30.
141. Id. at 730.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 742.
144. Id. at 732 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.214 (West 2002)).
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as a cause of action that can be used to supplement” the provisions of the
Code.145 Since the fraud claim was not preempted, the court addressed
the question of whether the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence of
fraud to raise an issue of material fact requiring trial.146 In a careful re-
view of the record, the court concluded the plaintiff failed to show a false
representation by the bank employee when the employee made the state-
ment about the funds “being there” because the provisional credit did
appear on the employee’s computer screen.147 Furthermore, the plaintiff
failed to show justifiable reliance on the bank’s representation where
statements in the exchange of emails, the discrepancy in the check
amount, and the prospective buyer’s refusal to sign a representation
agreement for the home purchase all pointed to the suspicious nature of
the transaction.148 Because of the failure to introduce sufficient evidence
to raise an issue of material fact in support of the fraud claim, this claim
was denied as well.149
B. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PAYOR BANK AND ITS CUSTOMER
Section 4.103 of the Code permits the provisions of Chapter 4 to be
varied by agreement, but a bank “cannot disclaim . . . responsibility for its
lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or limit the measure
of damages for the lack or failure.”150 The importance of Section 4.103
became apparent in the case of Sting Soccer Operations Group LP v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,151 where a bank closed the accounts of sev-
eral customers after receiving information that the customers may have
been engaged in illegal activities.152 The plaintiffs operated a soccer asso-
ciation that scheduled meets, arranged meals and lodging for players, and
advertised events at venues around the United States.153 Approximately
one and one-half years after the account closings, the plaintiffs sued the
bank on ten different theories. Both parties filed motions for summary
judgment.154 Although summary judgment was granted in favor of the
bank on some of the claims, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas held that others raised issues of material fact requiring
trial.155 From a commercial law perspective, the most important part of
145. Id. at 735–36 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.103(b) (West 2009) (“Un-
less displaced by the particular provisions of this title, the principles of law and equity . . .
and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepre-
sentation . . . or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.”)).
146. Id. at 736.
147. Id. at 738–39.
148. Id. at 740–41.
149. Id. at 741.
150. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.103(a) (West 2002).
151. No. 4:15-CV-127, 2016 WL 3917640 (E.D. Tex. July 20, 2016).
152. Id. at *1.
153. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 13–14, Sting Soccer Operations Grp.
LP, 2016 WL 3917640 (No. 4:15-CV-127).
154. Sting Soccer Operations Grp. LP, 2016 WL 3917640, at *3.
155. Id. at *14. The bank prevailed on some of the claims on the basis of the statute of
limitations having run or for failure of the plaintiff to show causation or recoverable loss.
2017] Commercial Transactions 119
the case was the bank’s argument that the plaintiffs waived the right to
recover consequential damages under a clause in the deposit agree-
ment.156 On that issue, the district court disagreed.157 Referring to Sec-
tion 4.103 of the Code, and the limitation on a bank’s right to disclaim
liability for a lack of good faith or the failure to exercise ordinary care,
the district court held that the clause did not waive the plaintiffs’ right to
seek consequential damages.158
Under Section 4.401 of the Code, a payor bank is entitled to charge
“properly payable” items against its customer’s account.159 If an item is
not properly payable, the customer can demand a re-credit for the
amount of the item, but the right to demand re-credit of an account is not
unlimited.160 Under Section 4.406 of the Code, after a bank “sends or
makes available [to a customer] a statement of account,” the customer
has a duty to report any unauthorized signatures or alterations shown on
the statement within the time limits stated in that section or in the deposit
agreement.161 If the customer fails in this duty, the customer may be
barred from recovering for any loss caused by improperly paid items.162
In Calleja-Ahedo v. Compass Bank,163 a bank customer delayed reporting
unauthorized charges on his account for some eighteen months after the
charges occurred.164 Under normal circumstances, the customer would be
barred from recovery by the one-year provision in Section 4.406,165 but
the circumstances in this case were hardly normal because of the inter-
Id. at *6–7, *10, *12–13. The plaintiffs survived summary judgment when the allegations
stated grounds for relief raising issues of material fact. Id. at *9–10, *12.
156. The clause in question read, “We [the bank] will not be liable for indirect, special,
or consequential damages regardless of the form of action and even if we have been ad-
vised of the possibility of such damages.” Id. at *13.
157. Id. at *14.
158. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.103(a) (West 2002)).
159. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.401(a) (West 2002) (“A bank may charge
against the account of a customer an item that is properly payable from that account even
though the charge creates an overdraft. An item is properly payable if it is authorized by
the customer and is in accordance with any agreement between the customer and the
bank.”).
160. See infra text accompanying notes 161–62.
161. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(c) (West 2002) (“If a bank sends or makes
available a statement of account or items pursuant to Subsection (a), the customer must
exercise reasonable promptness in examining the statement or the items to determine
whether any payment was not authorized because of an alteration of an item or because a
purported signature by or on behalf of the customer was not authorized. If, based on the
statement or items provided, the customer should reasonably have discovered the unautho-
rized payment, the customer must promptly notify the bank of the relevant facts.”). The
outside time limit in Section 4.406 is one year. See id. § 4.406(f). If multiple forgeries or
alterations are made by the same wrongdoer, the statutory time limit is shortened to thirty
days. See id. § 4.406(d). These time limits may be changed in a deposit agreement. See, e.g.,
Am. Airlines Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Martin, 29 S.W.3d 86, 96 (Tex. 2000) (deposit
agreements may shorten time for reporting unauthorized signatures or alterations); Can-
field v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 51 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. de-
nied) (same).
162. See BUS. & COM. § 4.406(c), (f).
163. 508 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. filed).
164. Id. at 793–94.
165. See BUS. & COM. § 4.406(f).
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vention of an unidentified wrongdoer. The customer, a citizen of Mexico
who lived in Mexico City, had opened the account in 1988. At that time,
he asked that account statements be sent to his brother who lived in
Texas. His brother had no responsibility to review the statements; this
was done by the customer from “time to time” when he visited his
brother in the United States.166 In June of 2012, an unknown third party
wrongdoer asked that the bank change the address where statements
were mailed and to send blank checks and a debit card to that address.
After this change was made, a series of checks and debit card transactions
resulted in charges that emptied the account. The problem came to light
when the customer learned that a check he had written was returned by
the bank with a notation that the account had been closed. The customer
promptly traveled to Texas, reviewed the bank statements for the last sev-
eral months, and notified the bank about the unauthorized charges to his
account.167 The bank defended on three grounds. First, the delay of eigh-
teen months barred recovery under Section 4.406(f). Second, the cus-
tomer’s brother was an employee of the customer under Section 3.405 of
the Code, and he had responsibility with respect to the account. Third,
the customer failed to exercise ordinary care that contributed to the for-
geries and barred the customer from recovery under Section 3.406 of the
Code.168
The first defense hinged on whether the bank had “sent or made avail-
able” the statements of account to trigger the customer’s duty to report
unauthorized transactions.169 The effectiveness of this defense depended
on which of two deposit agreements governed the rights of the parties.170
One of the agreements, termed the “2008 agreement,” did not clearly
identify the time when the duty to report would begin. The other agree-
ment, termed the “2012 agreement,” was more specific about the time
when the duty to report would begin. The bank argued that the 2012
agreement controlled because it was sent to the brother’s address in Feb-
ruary of 2012 and amended the 2008 agreement.171 The Houston Court of
Appeals rejected this argument because the bank failed to show its at-
tempt to amend the 2008 agreement complied with the provisions of the
Texas Finance Code governing amendment of deposit agreements.172 The
court of appeals then discussed the question of whether the customer had
a duty to report unauthorized charges when statements of account were
sent to addresses supplied by the wrongdoer.173 On this issue, referring to
the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Jefferson State Bank v.
166. Calleja-Ahedo, 508 S.W.3d at 796.
167. Id. at 793–94.
168. Id. at 801, 805–06.
169. Id. at 801.
170. See id. at 797–98.
171. Id. at 798, 802.
172. Id. at 798. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 34.302(b) (West 2013) specifies the manner in
which deposit agreements can be amended.
173. Calleja-Ahedo, 508 S.W.3d at 799–801.
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Lenk,174 the court of appeals held the duty to report did not arise.175
In regard to the issue of the brother acting as an employee for purposes
of the bar rule in Section 3.405, the court of appeals ruled there was “no
evidence” that the brother was an “employee” or had “any ‘responsibil-
ity’” beyond receiving and holding the bank statements for the customer
to review when he visited in the United States.176 On the question of
whether the customer’s lack of ordinary care had contributed to the for-
geries, the court of appeals reasoned that because the customer had no
knowledge of unauthorized activity on his account before the forgeries
occurred, any lack of diligence after learning of the forgeries did not
amount to a lack of ordinary care.177 The court of appeals reversed the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank and ren-
dered judgment in favor of the customer on his claim to re-credit his ac-
count.178 This case provides significant insight into the importance of
careful drafting of deposit agreements, and the need for documented no-
tification of account agreement changes.
VI. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. SECURITY INTEREST AS A PROPERTY RIGHT
Chapter 9 of the Code governs security interests in personal prop-
erty.179 Much of Chapter 9 is concerned with the substantive rights of
secured parties, debtors, and third parties asserting claims to collateral.180
In BCL-Equipment Leasing, LLC v. Davis,181 the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas addressed a procedural right of considerable
importance to secured parties. In BCL, the plaintiff alleged that the
buyer/lessor of an oil rig in a sale-leaseback arrangement refused to give
the plaintiff possession of the rig that was the subject of the transaction.
A third-party sought to intervene in the litigation on the ground that he
held a security interest in the rig.182 Referring to the definition of “secur-
ity interest” in Section 1-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the dis-
trict court held that a security interest was a property interest.183 Prior
case law made it clear that a party claiming a property interest was enti-
tled to intervene in a suit between other parties if the claimant’s right to
the property might be affected by the result of the litigation.184 Because
174. Id. at 800–01 (citing Jefferson State Bank v. Lenk, 323 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. 2010)). In
Lenk, the Texas Supreme Court held that mailing account statements to an imposter did
not trigger a duty to report under TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406 (West 2002). See
Lenk, 323 S.W.3d at 149.
175. Calleja-Ahedo, 508 S.W.3d at 803.
176. Id. at 805.
177. Id. at 806–07.
178. Id. at 807.
179. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(a)(1) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016).
180. See id. § 9.109
181. No. 2:15-CV-195-WCB, 2016 WL 115696 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016).
182. Id. at *1.
183. Id. at *2.
184. Id.
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the interest of the secured party in the case at bar was adverse to that of
the plaintiff, and could be affected by the outcome, intervention was al-
lowed with the secured party aligned as a defendant.185
B. SECURITY INTERESTS IN COMMERCIAL TORT CLAIMS
Under Section 9.108 of the Code, collateral can be described in a secur-
ity agreement in several different ways.186 Regardless of the method cho-
sen, the critical test is whether the description “reasonably identifies” the
collateral, but this test is subject to some important exceptions.187 One of
those exceptions deals with commercial tort claims.188 Reading Section
9.108 together with Section 9.204, it is clear that a commercial tort claim
must be in existence before a security interest can attach to the claim.189
The Comment to Section 9.108 notes that the claim need not be described
with specificity, but the description in the security agreement must at
least refer to an existing claim.190 In Bayer CropScience, LLC v. Stearns
Bank National Association,191 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit applied Texas law to resolve a dispute between two secured par-
ties (SP1 and SP2), each of whom asserted a priority interest in a debtor’s
tort claim.192
SP1 obtained and perfected a security interest in various items of col-
lateral. SP2 later took and perfected a security interest in some of the
same collateral. The debtor later brought a commercial tort claim against
a third party for damage caused to the collateral. While that claim was
pending, SP2 entered into a forbearance agreement with the debtor in
exchange for a security interest in the tort claim.193 SP2 perfected this
security interest by filing. The tort claim was ultimately settled and the
tortfeasor joined SP1 and SP2 in an interpleader action to determine how
185. Id. at *3–4.
186. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.108(b) (West 2011) contains a list of ways in
which collateral can be described, e.g., by specific listing, category, type defined in the
Code, quantity, etc.
187. Id. § 9.108(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (c), (d), and (e), a
description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it rea-
sonably identifies what is described.”); id. § 9.108(c) (providing that supergeneric descrip-
tions, such as “all of debtor’s personal property” are not sufficient); id. § 9.108(d) (stating a
special rule for certain investment property); id. § 9.108(e) (excluding descriptions by
“type” for commercial tort claims, consumer goods, and consumer investment property).
188. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(13) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016) (defining
a “commercial tort claim” as “a claim arising in tort with respect to which: (A) the claimant
is an organization; or (B) the claimant is an individual and the claim: (i) arose in the course
of the claimant’s business or profession; and (ii) does not include damages arising out of
personal injury to or the death of an individual”).
189. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.204(b) (West 2011) (“A security interest does
not attach under a term constituting an after-acquired property clause to: . . . (2) a com-
mercial tort claim.”); see id. § 9.108.
190. Id. § 9.108 cmt. 5 (“Subsection (e) does not require a description to be specific. For
example, a description such as ‘all tort claims arising out of the explosion of debtor’s fac-
tory’ would suffice . . . .”).
191. 837 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 2016).
192. Id. at 914.
193. Id. at 913–14.
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the settlement funds were to be divided between them.194
SP1 argued that it had priority because its security interest covered
general intangibles.195 According to SP1, once the tort claim was settled,
the “right to payment” under the settlement became “a payment intangi-
ble,” a “subset of a general intangible,” and its first perfected security
interest had priority in the funds.196 SP2 contended that this logic allowed
SP1 to evade the need to identify a commercial tort as required in Sec-
tions 9.108 and 9.204, and since SP2 was the only secured party who had a
security interest in the identified tort claim, it should have priority in the
settlement funds.197
The Eighth Circuit agreed with SP2 that the claim of SP1 did not ex-
tend to the commercial tort claim itself because that claim did not exist
when SP1 acquired its security interest.198 However, some of SP1’s collat-
eral was damaged by the third-party tortfeasor, and this damage consti-
tuted proceeds of SP1’s original collateral.199 Thus, “to the extent that”
SP1 could show the settlement funds constituted “payment for damages
to [its] original collateral,” SP1 would have a priority claim for that
amount.200
C. PRIORITIES IN DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
In re Tusa-Expo Holdings, Inc.201 is the most interesting secured trans-
action case decided during the Survey period. Although the case arose in
the context of a preference claim by the debtor’s bankruptcy trustee, a
decision on this issue required the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit to interpret and apply Section 9.332 of the Code.202 Because this
section rarely appeared in prior case law, the Fifth Circuit was writing on
an essentially blank slate.
Section 9.332 contains only two rules.203 Subsection (a) protects trans-
194. Id. at 914.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 915; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109 cmt. 15 (West 2011 & Supp.
2016) (“[O]nce a claim arising in tort has been settled and reduced to a contractual obliga-
tion to pay, the right to payment becomes a payment intangible and ceases to be a claim
arising in tort.”).
197. Bayer CropScience, LLC, 837 F.3d at 914–16.
198. Id. at 915–16.
199. The Eighth Circuit noted that the definition of “proceeds” in TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(65)(D) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016) provides, “Proceeds include ‘to
the extent of the value of collateral, claims arising out of the loss, nonconformity, or inter-
ference with the use of, defects or infringement of rights in, damage to the collateral.’”
Bayer CropScience, LLC, 837 F.3d at 916. The Eighth Circuit also noted that BUS. & COM
§ 9.102 cmt. 5(g) states, “A security interest in a tort claim also may exist under this Article
if the claim is proceeds of other collateral.” Id. at 917.
200. Id.
201. 811 F.3d 786 (5th Cir. 2016).
202. See id. at 794.
203. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.332(a) (West 2011) (“A transferee of money
takes the money free of a security interest unless the transferee acts in collusion with the
debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.”); id. § 9.332(b) (“A transferee of funds
from a deposit account takes the funds free of a security interest in the deposit account
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ferees of money from a deposit account.204 Subsection (b) protects trans-
ferees of funds from a deposit account.205 In In re Tusa-Expo, a creditor
had a perfected security interest in the debtor’s inventory of office furni-
ture.206 As part of a debt restructuring agreement, the debtor obtained a
loan from another creditor. This creditor took a security interest in the
debtor’s inventory and also required the debtor to open a deposit account
for the deposit of payments made by the debtor’s customers on accounts
arising from their purchase of furniture. The security interest in the de-
posit account was perfected by control. Deposits to this account were
swept daily and credited to the debtor’s revolving loan to “increase the
available credit” to the debtor on this loan, and new advances on the
revolving loan were made to the debtor upon request (up to the available
current balance).207 A critical part of the restructuring was a subordina-
tion agreement between the first secured party and the second secured
party. This agreement provided that the first secured party would retain
priority in any payments made on “specified accounts receivable” depos-
ited in the deposit account controlled by the second secured party.208
The trustee argued that the first secured party lost its security interest
in the deposited funds when the funds were swept by the second secured
party and advanced to the debtor under the revolving loan arrange-
ment.209 The first secured party argued that its security interest in the
funds was automatically perfected by Section 9.315(b) as proceeds of its
security interest in inventory when they were deposited in the deposit
account, and that Section 9.332(b) did not affect this perfected interest
when the funds were swept and later advanced to the debtor by the sec-
ond security party.210 In effect, the first secured party was arguing that no
preference occurred because these funds were merely a substitute for its
original security interest in inventory and this was not a preferential pay-
ment under the preference exception in § 547(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy
Code.211 Based on its reading of Section 9.332(b), the Fifth Circuit agreed
with the first secured party.212 In the view of the Fifth Circuit, “the funds
in a deposit account remain unencumbered by a security interest in the
deposit account itself.”213 This line of reasoning meant, in turn, that the
first secured party retained its first priority security interest in the funds
when they were swept by the second secured party and later advanced to
unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured
party.”).
204. See id. § 9.332(a).
205. See id. § 9.332(b).
206. In re Tusa-Expo, 811 F.3d at 789.
207. Id. at 790.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 794.
210. Id. at 794–95.
211. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (2012) prevents the trustee from avoiding a transfer unless
the transfer allows a “creditor to receive more than . . . [it] would receive if . . . the case
were a” liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
212. In re Tusa-Expo, 811 F.3d at 795–96.
213. Id. at 796.
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the debtor.214 In a sense, one could say this rationale was merely treating
the first secured party’s security interest as a kind of transmutation of
collateral from inventory to funds in a deposit account and back to funds
in the hands of the debtor with no net gain (i.e., preference) accruing to
the first secured party. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the trustee failed
to prove the first secured party received a preference.215 The Fifth Circuit
gave only a passing reference to the effect of the subordination agree-
ment between the first and second secured parties.216 This is a somewhat
peculiar omission but it may have been because, as the Fifth Circuit
pointed out in a footnote, the parties themselves did not raise the issue.217
In re Tusa-Expo is a fascinating case because the result seems to mean
that a security interest in a deposit account attaches only to the account
itself and not to the funds contained in the account. This is a little like
taking a security interest in an eggshell, but the security interest does not
attach to the contents of the egg. If this is true, why bother? Furthermore,
how does this interpretation square with the elaborate provisions in
Chapter 9 dealing with perfection by control and priorities between par-
ties who have control?218 The interpretation of Section 9.332(b) in In re
Tusa-Expo raises interesting questions and at least one source has re-
ferred to the result in In re Tusa-Expo as “illogical.”219
D. DISPUTES BETWEEN FACTORS AND ACCOUNT DEBTORS
It is not uncommon for a business to sell goods or services in exchange
for a promise of future payment. The future payment can take several
forms, including a sale in which the purchaser promises to pay for the
goods or services within a certain time period, but the obligation is repre-
sented by entry in an account and not by a negotiable instrument or a
contract specifically related to a particular purchase. “Accounts” are de-
fined in Section 9.102(a)(2) of the Code as “a right to payment of a mone-
214. See id. at 796–97.
215. Id. at 801. Because the funds had been commingled during their transit into and
out of the deposit account, a subsidiary issue was whether the first secured party or the
trustee had the burden of tracing the funds as proceeds of collateral or as coming from
another source. Id. at 797–99. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.315(b)(2) (2011) puts the
burden on the secured party, but 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (2012) of the Bankruptcy Code puts
the burden on the trustee. See id. at 797–98. The Fifth Circuit held that § 547(g) prevailed
and the trustee failed to carry this burden. Id. at 799.
216. Id. at 797.
217. See id. at 797 n.35 (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.339 (West 2011)
(“This chapter does not preclude subordination by agreement by a person entitled to prior-
ity.”)). Because the second secured party had subordinated its security interest to that of
the first secured party, reference to this section may have made the interpretation of TEX.
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.332 (2011) unnecessary.
218. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.104, .310(b)(8), .312(b)(1), .322(d) &
(e) & .327 (West 2011).
219. See More Line Drawing II, 50 U.C.C. L. LETTER No. 11, NL2 (Jan. 2017). An
excellent article discussing security interests in deposit accounts may be found in Bruce A.
Markell, From Property to Contract and Back: An Examination of Deposit Accounts and
Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963 (1999).
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tary obligation, whether or not earned by performance.”220 Section 9.109
provides that Chapter 9 applies to security interests in accounts, and to
the outright sale of accounts.221 If a seller assigns or sells an account to a
third party (often termed a “factor”), the third party can notify the pur-
chaser of the goods or services that payments on the account are to be
made directly to the third party and not to the original seller. In these
cases, the purchaser becomes the “account debtor.”222
In Tempay, Inc. v. Tanintco, Inc.,223 an employment service generated
accounts by supplying temporary employees to its customers. The em-
ployment service then assigned the accounts to a factoring company that
was then to notify the account debtors to make payments on the accounts
directly to the factor. The initial notice letter sent to one of the account
debtors contained a number of errors making it unclear about where pay-
ments were to be sent.224 This lack of clarity was eventually resolved and
the account debtor made payments to the factor for approximately one
year when an employee of the employment service business embarked on
a money laundering scheme. That employee orally notified the account
debtor to make future payments directly to the employment service and
the account debtor did so.225 After the employee’s dishonesty was discov-
ered, the factor sued the employment service, the dishonest employee,
and the account debtor for the missing payments. The account debtor
defended by arguing that errors in the initial notice of assignment ren-
dered it ineffective or that the notice was no longer in effect after the
account debtor was orally notified by the employee that payments were
to be made directly to the employment service. The factor prevailed on its
claim against the employment service and the dishonest employee, but
not against the account debtor. The factor appealed.226
On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals ruled that the initial notice and
the surrounding circumstances raised a question of fact about whether
the notice complied with the requirement of Section 9.406(b)(1) that a
notice “reasonably identify” the rights assigned to the factor.227 As to the
220. The definition in TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(2) (West 2011 & Supp.
2016) also provides a list of transactions that result in the creation of an account and a list
that excludes transactions that create another type of collateral under Chapter 9.
221. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(a) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016).
222. The term “account debtor” is defined in BUS. & COM. § 9.102(a)(3) as the “person
obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible. The term does not include
persons obligated to pay a negotiable instrument, even if the instrument constitutes part of
chattel paper.”
223. No. 05-15-00130-CV, 2016 WL 192596 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 15, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
224. Id. at *1.
225. Id. at *2. The opinion does not describe exactly how the employee was able to
divert the payments to her own use, but it is likely that she either intercepted the payments
as they arrived or had them sent to an account that she controlled. Regardless of the spe-
cific method used, the employee obtained use of more than $500,000 in misdirected pay-
ments. See id.
226. Id. at *3.
227. Id. at *7; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.406(b)(1) (West 2011 & Supp.
2016). On this issue, the court of appeals noted that the account debtor had made pay-
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effectiveness of the assignment after the employee orally notified the ac-
count debtor of a change in the payment instructions, the court of appeals
held that the factor raised a “genuine issue of material fact” about
whether a change in the payment instructions “had to be in writing.”228
Because both issues raised questions of fact, the judgment of the trial
court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.229
VII. CONCLUSION
As usual, the cases reported during this Survey period addressed ques-
tions under several Chapters of the Business & Commerce Code. While
some were reaffirmations of prior holdings or direct application of the
Code, others explored new territory on difficult issues.230 The cases in-
volving the intersection of contract provisions and the interpretation of
the Code were of particular interest because they concern the drafting
limits parties may face in using a contract to write their own law.231
ments directly to the factor for more than a year despite the mistakes in the initial notice.
Tempay, 2016 WL 192596, at *7.
228. Id. at *8–9.
229. Id. at *9.
230. See, e.g., In re Tusa-Expo Holdings, Inc., 811 F.3d 786 (5th Cir. 2016) (paucity of
prior case law required interpretation of Section 9.332(b)); Del Castillo v. PMI Holdings N.
Am. Inc., No. 4:14-CV-03435, 2016 WL 3745953, *3 (S.D. Tex. July 13, 2016) (prior case
law established that notice must be given to remote parties who may be liable for breach of
warranty); Becker v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-520-BJ, 2015 WL 6742104, *9–10
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2015), appeal filed, No. 16-10166 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2016) (under Section
2.719 of the Code, buyer could recover direct damages for breach of express warranty but
contract properly disclaimed liability for consequential damages); Jack Cty. Appraisal Dist.
v. Jack Cty. Hosp. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 228, 232–36 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.)
(majority and dissent disagreed about whether transaction was a lease-purchase or a fi-
nance lease under Chapter 2A).
231. See, e.g., Sting Soccer Operations Grp. LP v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No.
4:15-CV-127, 2016 WL 3917640 (E.D. Tex. July 20, 2016) (deposit agreement could not
disclaim bank’s lack of good faith in dealing with customer’s account); Calleja-Ahedo v.
Compass Bank, 508 S.W.3d 791, 801–03 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. filed)
(for bank to invoke rule barring recovery under Section 4.406, deposit agreement must
specify how account statements are to be sent or made available).
